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LIBERTY AND LOYALTY:  
THE GREAT WAR AND LABOUR’S CONSCRIPTION DILEMMA 
 
 
Robin Archer 
London School of Economics 
 
 
Précis: A unique struggle over conscription was a defining characteristic of the Australian 
experience of the Great War. The labour movement was at the center of opposition to 
conscription, and arguments from liberty were central to its stance. But anti-
conscriptionists had to make their arguments in an environment shaped by powerful 
competing appeals to loyalty. This article examines the ways in which labour anti-
conscriptionists sought to minimise the impact of these loyalist appeals, while pressing 
ahead with their central liberal arguments. Two ways of interpreting these arguments 
enabled them to do this. The first emphasised the Britishness of the liberal tradition and 
the close relationship between conscription and ‘continental despotism’. The second 
emphasised the affinity between the liberal tradition and the New World and drew on 
other comparisons, especially with North America.  
 
 1 
LIBERTY AND LOYALTY:  
THE GREAT WAR AND LABOUR’S CONSCRIPTION DILEMMA 
 
The Australian conflict over conscription during the First World War was extraordinary 
by any standard. It gave rise to what was arguably the most intense and bitter political 
schism the country ever experienced.
1
 And both the outcome of the conflict and the 
process that led to it were quite without precedent, not just in Australia but anywhere in 
the world.  
 
In the historically liberal English-speaking countries, conscription had long been 
anathema. Unlike in all the other belligerents, none of these countries had conscript 
armies in place when the war broke out. Yet in the course of the war, most of their 
governments eventually sought to introduce conscription. And wherever governments 
made this effort, they eventually succeeded, although usually only well into the war and 
after a long period of anguished debate. Australia was the sole exception. Only there was 
opposition strong enough to stop conscription from being introduced.
2
  
 
The process that led to this outcome was also wholly unique. On two occasions, on 28 
October 1916 and on 20 December 1917, the Commonwealth government tried to 
introduce conscription by seeking the consent of citizens in a referendum. On the first 
occasion, the referendum was held in an effort to bypass parliamentary opposition. On 
the second occasion, it was held in order to over turn the outcome of the first. Each time 
the proposal was narrowly rejected.  
 
At the heart of the opposition to conscription was Australia’s precociously powerful 
labour movement. It was the opposition of Labor MPs that led Prime Minister Hughes to 
opt for a referendum in the first place, and it was Labor Party and trade union 
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organizations that were far and away the most important constituent groups within the 
anti-conscription campaign.
3
 
 
Elsewhere I have examined the arguments within the labour movement that led so many 
Labor MPs and activists to oppose conscription, and I will briefly summarise those 
findings below. However, anti-conscriptionists had to make their arguments in an 
environment marked by powerful counter-arguments from the proponents of conscription 
– arguments that also had resonance within the labour movement. Here I want to examine 
how labour anti-conscriptionists framed their arguments in order to navigate their way 
through this environment and minimize the impact of the charges levelled against them.  
 
I have examined their arguments both before and after the outbreak of war. But I have 
paid special attention to the year or so prior to the first referendum, since that was when 
the basic lineaments of their stance congealed.
4
  
 
From late 1915 onwards, a series of developments took place that eventually made 
conscription the all-consuming focus of public life. Labor had won the federal election in 
September 1914 under the leadership of Andrew Fisher. As Prime Minister, despite some 
initiatives that could be seen as foreshadowing conscription, Fisher had sought to 
reassure opponents that it was not on the agenda. But by the end of October 1915 he had 
resigned and been replaced by William Morris Hughes – long one of the principal 
advocates of compulsory military training. In mid January 1916, Hughes left for London 
via New Zealand and North America to consult other leaders. Meanwhile, various 
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 3 
developments – growing pressure from pro-conscription groups and the opposition 
Liberal Party; the introduction and extension of conscription in Britain; Hughes 
increasingly strident rhetoric; and a series of conferences from January to May in which 
key Labor Party and trade union organizations committed themselves to strenuous 
opposition – combined to bring the conflict over conscription to fever pitch. Hughes 
returned to Australia on 31 July 1916, announced the decision to hold a referendum on 30 
August, and succeeded in passing enabling legislation in late September. The referendum 
was set for 28 October.  
 
The Argument from Liberty 
 
Labour anti-conscriptionists invoked multiple arguments. But liberal arguments were 
central to how they understood their opposition.
5
 These arguments were the centerpiece 
of labour’s objection to conscription from the outset. “An outrage on liberty” was how 
labour’s most influential paper summarized its response to the introduction of 
conscription in Britain.
6
 And as pressure for conscription began to mount in Australia, it 
warned that “there is no question of greater importance than this. It goes to the very 
sources of our being. Are we free men? Or are we slaves?”7  
 
Liberal concerns were also at the heart of the arguments put forward by the movers of the 
critical anti-conscription resolutions adopted in April and May 1916 by the Victorian 
Political Labor Council (PLC), the NSW Political Labor League (PLL), and the special 
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All Australia Trade Union Congress on Conscription, which together sealed in place 
labour’s opposition in the key eastern states.8  
 
These concerns were compounded by fears that the case for military conscription could 
easily be extended to justify industrial conscription in the workplace. They were 
reinforced by the increasingly authoritarian political environment in which labour found 
itself and the increasingly strident rhetoric of the Prime Minister. And they can be found 
in private correspondence as well as in public debate.
9
 
 
Liberty-based arguments continued to be prominent after Hughes announced his intention 
of holding a referendum. According to the Secretary of the Melbourne Trades Hall 
Council, E.J. Holloway, who was arguably the most significant Labor Party and union 
official in the country: “The great test has come. … We must choose between Freedom 
and Slavery. If we would be Free, then we must fight to the last gasp against the 
introduction of conscription in Australia.”10 Similar arguments remained prominent in the 
final manifestos issued on the eve of the referendum.
11
  
 
The Loyalism Dilemma 
 
However, in making these arguments, Labour anti-conscriptionists faced a dilemma. At 
its heart was their claim to be both Australian nationalists and British Empire loyalists. 
The dilemma had two sources. Facing outwards, it stemmed from their need to frame 
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their arguments in an ideological space partly defined by their opponents’ emphasis on 
loyalty. But it also stemmed from the dual commitments present within labour’s ranks.  
 
The dilemma can already be seen in Andrew Fisher’s initial responses to the prospect of 
war during the 1914 federal election campaign. On 31 July 1914 he made his famous 
speech that should the worst happen and Britain go to war, “Australians will stand beside 
our own to help defend her to our last man and our last shilling.” Yet on 4 August he 
gave another speech in which he said that his policy was to put “Australia first, the 
Empire second”.12 
 
Labor was acutely aware of the dangers of being painted as disloyal to Britain, as Fisher’s 
letters to his wife, his early experience of the ‘Union Jackals’ in the wake of the 
Dreadnaught crisis in 1909 and 1911, and the charges of ‘disloyalty’ levelled at Labor in 
their opponents’ election propaganda all make clear.13 To counter them, the Party made 
repeated use of the ‘last man and last shilling’ slogan. However Fisher’s comments about 
putting Australia first accorded more closely with Labor’s previous thinking.  
 
The instinct of much of the labour movement was to assert the importance of 
Australianness, while taking for granted the continuing importance of imperial ties to 
Britain. In its last issue before the prospect of war redirected the election campaign, the 
Worker complained about a new stamp that “hasn’t even a sprig of wattle to proclaim its 
nationality. The King’s head is its main feature and the roo and emu are conspicuous by 
their absence”. And on the eve of the election, it accused Labor’s opponents of being the 
“Hate-Australian party” for having opposed, inter alia, the establishment of an Australian 
navy. Likewise, the Labor Call insisted that, while “we will assist England” and are not 
disloyal to the Empire, “we say Australia first”.14  
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But loyalist pressure abated only briefly after the election. Stoked by the war, as well as 
party interests, it again began to mount, with the conscription agitation as its principal 
focus. Constant trumpeting of the thousands of unionists who had volunteered to serve 
and the “magnificent contribution” of the labour movement betrayed a certain 
defensiveness. An article about an Australian-born Labor MP and his multiple sons, 
grandsons, nephews and nieces on active service, concluded that this was “another strong 
proof, if any were needed, as to the loyalty of the Australian-born”. Clearly the journal 
thought it was needed.
15
  
 
There was a small number of activists and writers for whom this was purely a question of 
tactical necessity. For Australian nationalism and Empire loyalism were not the only 
options. There was another option – genuine internationalism – that exercised an 
influence on a number of strategically located individuals and led to the occasional direct 
challenge to patriotic loyalties of either sort. Typical were those, like the Victorian 
Socialist Party (VSP) leader Robert Ross, who were influenced by socialist 
internationalism. The VSP had successfully sponsored the Hardie-Vaillant resolution at 
the Melbourne THC in June 1914, and the symbolic affirmation of internationalism 
remained important to it, even within the limits set by the War Precautions Act.
16
 The 
Australian Peace Alliance’s Frederick Riley was also sometimes prepared to draw 
attention to the equivalence of all sides in the conflict.
17
 And Henry Boote, the editor of 
the Australian Worker and arguably labour’s most influential ideas-merchant, had been 
influenced by this tradition as well. Both in public and in private he sometimes expressed 
hostility to patriotism of all sorts. In private in August 1914 he told Mary Gilmore – the 
poet and editor of the women’s page in the Worker – that he supported “neither the 
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Germans nor the English”, and in public he argued that the evolution of that “queer 
thing” patriotism would be incomplete “till it stretches over the whole human race”.18  
 
But as with wholehearted hostility to the war, the wholehearted embrace of 
internationalism carried the danger of leaving its advocates marginalised or silenced or 
both.
19
 The appeal of Australian nationalism, like the related appeal of the White 
Australia policy, was far wider, and the appeal to it, far safer.  
 
However, the appeal of loyalty to Britain and the Empire was also very widespread. And 
it had a strong purchase in the ranks and among the leaders of the labour movement. At 
the close of an election rally in NSW, Fisher asked for “three cheers for the British 
Empire”. His audience responded with hearty cheers followed by a rousing rendition of 
‘Rule Britannia’.20 This was not unusual. Declarations of loyalty to the British Empire at 
labour rallies were regularly greeted by loud cheering and an outburst of singing.
21
 The 
1915 Commonwealth conference of the Labor Party also passed a loyal resolution on the 
occasion of the King’s Birthday – not something it had ever previously done – praying 
that his reign be crowned by British victory. Its passage was met with “resounding cheers 
and the singing of ‘God Save the King’.22 
 
Just as ‘liberty’ was the great rallying cry of the anti-conscriptionists, ‘loyalty’ was the 
great cry of their opponents. What gave the loyalism dilemma its central importance was 
the public rhetoric of these opponents, which was constantly challenging the loyalist 
credentials of labour anti-conscriptionists. Anti-conscriptionists were thus faced with the 
danger of dissonance between their arguments and an influential current of public opinion 
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championed by their opponents. To minimise this danger, they had to think carefully 
about the way they framed their arguments.  
 
There were two interpretations of their central liberal argument to which anti-
conscriptionists could appeal. Each served, in effect, to give the argument a geography. 
One interpretation emphasised the Britishness of the liberal tradition. The other 
emphasised the special affinity between the liberal tradition and the New World. Two 
different ways of seeing Australia followed from this. Should Australia see itself as a new 
(and true) British community or as a part of the New World? These points of view were 
not mutually exclusive. But they were sometimes in tension. Should Britain be seen as 
the home of liberty or as part of the hide-bound liberty-constraining Old World?  
 
The British Tradition 
 
According to the first interpretation, Britain was the home of liberal values and 
institutions and being a free people was a special characteristic of the British. As a British 
community, Australia had an obligation to uphold this heritage and deliver on its 
promise. Thus the defence of Australia’s freedoms was mandated not just by moral right 
but also by British tradition. If Australia was fighting to defend Britain, this was a 
significant part of what it was fighting for. The labour press often invoked this special 
relationship between Britain and freedom. “Freedom of expression,” for example, was 
“the glory of the British race”, and the absence of conscription, in particular, was one of 
the “chief marks of her freedom”.23 This position was, of course, shared with British anti-
conscriptionists. “Freedom from conscription is one of the few great heritages of freedom 
that belong to the British nation,” declared the National Council of the (British) 
Independent Labour Party (ILP) in a statement prominently reproduced in the Labor 
Call.
24
 Likewise, the Worker argued that “the British for long centuries have stood out in 
the splendid virility of their opposition to compulsory military service. They have fought 
many wars. Victory after victory is inscribed on their banners. … And always it has been 
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with the spirit of free men. … It was the voluntary character of the British forces which 
stood as a bar between the nation and the despoilers of liberty.”25  
 
Labour anti-conscriptionists paid close attention to developments in Britain. And the 
decision in January 1916 to introduce conscription there brought discussion about British 
tradition to the fore. “The news … comes as a painful shock to all who love the British 
nation,” said the Worker. The introduction of conscription would rob British workers “of 
a precious heritage of freedom.”26 A month later it observed that “those ancient liberties 
which were once the pride and prerogative of the race already seem to have become pale 
shadows … [in] a country in which the instinct of the people for freedom had withstood a 
thousand shocks of tyranny.”27  
 
The introduction of conscription in Britain had a number of more specific consequences.  
First, it gave the labour press a special interest in the ongoing opposition of the British 
labour movement and especially the Trades Union Congress (TUC).
28
 Second, it placed 
the labour movement on high alert and made it deeply sceptical about apparent offers of 
exemption (such as those to married men, which in Britain, though ostensibly central to 
the initial argument for conscription, were renounced within months) or the significance 
of measures which were purportedly nothing to do with conscription (such as the 
collection of data on available military manpower).
29
 Protestations of good faith were less 
credible in light of the British experience. Observing this experience reduced the 
likelihood of giving incremental moves towards conscription the benefit of the doubt and 
made the Australian labour movement less susceptible to ‘salami’ tactics. Third, and most 
importantly, it forced anti-conscriptionists to alter the way in which they invoked 
Britishness. Henceforth, they could not simply invoke British tradition, they had to 
invoke it against British practice. As a result, the conflict between pro-conscriptionists 
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and anti-conscriptionists became, in part, a conflict between different kinds of British 
loyalty: loyalty to what Britain was doing versus loyalty to British ideas.  
 
The juxtaposition of conscription and British ideas was clearly present in the first major 
union resolution against conscription, which declared that the Australian Workers’ Union 
(AWU) “absolutely opposes the principle of conscription as being opposed to the spirit of 
our time and race”.30 It was also invoked at the Brisbane Industrial Council, where an 
Australia-wide conference on conscription was first suggested. “As a Britisher, proud of 
his country and her great tradition of freedom,” said a delegate, “he had always been 
undeviatingly opposed to compulsion, which was anti-British”.31 A resolution opposing 
the government’s war census questionnaires as tantamount to conscription was carried 
unanimously. And this juxtaposition remained a feature thereafter. The main Queensland 
anti-conscription appeal urged citizens to “stand faithful” to “all those glorious traditions 
of the British race that lie behind us”.32 And the Labor Call argued that “Conscription 
would be a betrayal of the very principle on which Britain has prided herself – freedom of 
conscience for all ...don’t betray your Christianity and your British traditions … [and] 
give up your glorious freedom.”.33 This reasoning had a broad resonance. In a public 
address, the NSW Chief Justice, Sir William Cullen, noted that “many people wanted to 
submit the population to iron discipline. He did not think that a British people would. 
They valued their liberty too much.”34  
 
However the anti-conscriptionists still faced a problem. This formulation of the defence 
of British tradition went some way towards neutralising loyalist ripostes. But it still left 
them vulnerable to a simple-minded loyalism that would brook no criticism of any sort. 
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In the often infantile debate surrounding loyalism, one complexity could be one 
complexity too many. A potential solution to this problem was to shift the focus from the 
British tradition itself to what everyone agreed was its opposite – continental despotism. 
This had the effect of shifting attention from what everyone said they were for to what 
everyone said they were against. While the focus was on Britain, anti-conscriptionists 
remained susceptible to a certain kind of criticism: you say that you’re for Britain but you 
won’t support what it’s doing. With this change of focus, it was the pro-conscriptionists 
who were susceptible to this kind of criticism: you say that you’re against despots but 
you want us to do what they’re doing.  
 
‘Continental despotism’ was long established in the popular imagination – including the 
popular conservative imagination – as the antithesis of Britishness. And the institution of 
conscription was widely seen as one of its defining characteristics. Catholic absolutists, 
Napoleon Bonaparte, and the Czars had all played a part in confirming Britain’s special 
status as the land of the free. Now, of course, the great continental despot was the Kaiser. 
But the paradigm was still Napoleon – the central opponent in the last long military 
conflict in which Britain had been involved. It was a conflict that had penetrated deep 
into people’s lives and unleashed huge social changes – a massive two decade long 
globe-spanning war in itself, as well as the culmination of a conflict of many decades 
more with the absolutist rulers of France.
35
  
 
Anti-conscriptionists made great use of this reasoning. It can already be seen in Boote’s 
earliest reaction to the introduction of conscription in Britain and in the reasoning behind 
the AWU’s agenda setting anti-conscription resolution.36 Indeed it predated this.37 And it 
was a regular feature thereafter. “What is German militarism based on but conscription 
… should this free land be submitted to the very curse that it is voluntarily sacrificing the 
pick of its manhood to crush,” asked a letter in the Worker. In order to stop itself from 
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being Prussianised, Australia had to Prussianise itself. “Anticipatory” Prussianism. This 
was the Prime Minister’s “Wonderful logic!” “They yell patriotism with one breath and 
act Prussianism with another,” wrote the Labor Call’s editor, William Wallis. It is 
“Prussianism in excelsis,” said a former Member of the House of Representatives.38 
 
After his return to Australia, and especially after finally and definitely declaring himself 
for conscription on 30 August, this criticism increasingly attached itself to the person of 
Hughes. It was further fuelled by Hughes increasingly authoritarian approach to the 
referendum, with pre-emptive call ups and fingerprinting, show trials of the Industrial 
Workers of the World (IWW), attempts to manipulate the soldiers’ vote, and, in a move 
that left him without half his cabinet, interference in the polling process itself. Sometimes 
he is characterised as a Kaiser or said to have embraced other Prussian qualities.
39
 But 
more often still he is said to have become a Napoleon.  
 
The continuing currency of Napoleon as the paradigm of continental despotism is 
apparent among otherwise disparate opinion-formers. Both the Sydney Morning Herald 
and the Labor Call sought to understand the outbreak of the war by comparing it with the 
struggle against Napoleonic tyranny. The Labor Call even contrived to farewell the first 
departing AIF volunteers by invoking Nelson. “Australia expects,” it intoned.40 Both may 
have been influenced by leading conservative opinion-formers in Britain, who reached 
for this analogy from the outset.
41
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Anti-conscriptionists seized on this language. Hughes was “Australia’s political 
Napoleon”, the “new Napoleon” or “the Napoleonic Hughes”.42 Perhaps he was not 
wholly displeased. As he crossed the Pacific to Vancouver en route to the UK, a fancy 
dress ball was held on Hughes’ boat. “I nearly broke my heart at not being able to go as 
Napoleon,” he wrote to Pearce.43 A striking cartoon by Claude Marquet captures the 
essence of the continental despotism critique in this personalised form. [See Figure X.] 
The cartoon first appeared in the Worker and was then reprinted after the result in the 
Labor Call and the Socialist – testimony to the centrality of its core message and the wide 
ranging appeal of this reasoning. Commenting on the result, the Labor Call declared 
simply that “The Australian Napoleon has met his Waterloo”.44  
 
The New World  
 
The second way in which anti-conscriptionists interpreted their central liberal argument 
and gave it a geography was by associating it with the advantages that the New World 
had over the Old. The social hierarchy and political autocracy of the Old World had long 
been identified as inhospitable to liberty. These characteristics both fostered and partly 
depended on militarism and the institution of conscription that lay at its core. By contrast 
the more egalitarian and democratic social and political structure of the New World was 
more conducive to liberty. But if conscription and militarism were grafted onto such a 
society it would jeopardise these freedom-fostering features and threaten regression into 
the Old World morass from which its citizens and their forebears had extricated 
themselves. Under conscription, “the European officer lords it over private and civilian 
alike.” In short, it “makes a man a serf” or “a beast” and it “lowers his manhood”.45 This 
                                                 
42
 LC, 17 Aug 1916, 4 & 10; LC, 16 Oct 1916, 4. See also the background image in the cartoon in AW, 5 
Oct 1916, 17. 
43
 L.F. Fitzhardinge, The Little Digger, 1914-1952 (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1979), 71. This was, of 
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hero. See Meaney, World Crisis, 174.  
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 AW, 19 Oct 1916, 1; LC, 2 Nov 1916, 3 & 4; Socialist, 17 Nov 1916, 1. 
45
 See Wallis in LC, 27 April 1916, 6 and LC, 18 May 1916, 8. Note that the language of manhood was 
often used in two competing ways. Sometimes, as here, it referred to independence or autonomy. For pro-
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was “Europe’s ghastly conscription fate” and, to avoid it, Australians must “slay the old 
world devil”.46  
 
Prior to the First World War, the standard point of reference for these arguments was the 
United States. The idea that Australia had the potential to be “another America” and the 
practice of looking there for inspiration was already well established in the early 1890s. 
Left-wing reform thought emanating from the United States was particularly influential. 
Indeed for a time it was probably the most influential external source of left-wing 
ideological influence. For example, the Worker and its forerunner, the Hummer, were 
particularly keen on drawing inspiration from experiments with labour populist politics in 
the United States. The very spelling of the Labor Party’s name may well be testimony to 
this American influence.
47
  
 
However the dilemmas facing anti-conscriptionists made them wary of looking to the 
United States for lessons. Partly this was simply a consequence of censorship, which 
made access to some US journals difficult and reprinting US articles risky. Leading 
American publications like the Appeal to Reason were deemed a ‘prohibited import’ by 
the Australian censor.
48
  But over and above this, appealing to American experience now 
had a double disadvantage. It was not just that, with the passions unleashed by the war, 
any appeal to the United States carried the whiff of disloyalty to Britain. It was also, more 
fundamentally, that, with the United States remaining neutral and Wilson campaigning 
for re-election on a ‘he kept us out of the war’ platform, appealing to American 
                                                                                                                                                 
conscriptionists it often referred to physical courage or willingness to fight (indeed willingness to die). But 
the distinction between pro- and anti- conscriptionists was not clear cut. For example, in the latter anti-
conscription article cited here it is actually used in both ways in the course of the article. 
46
 See Boote’s poem ‘Up, Australia!’ in AW, 28 Sept 1916, 17. Note that Labor Call’s Wallis was 
particularly enamoured of these New World arguments, although they were also used by Boote in the 
Worker and VSP activists like Villiers. See also Villiers in 5 Oct 1916, 6, and Wallis in LC, 25 May 1916, 
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47
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Press, 2007), 17, 163, 209-14.  
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128. With a run of about three quarters of a million in 1913, the Appeal to Reason had the widest 
circulation of any socialist publication in the US. See John Graham, ed., “Yours for the Revolution”: The 
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experience threatened to damage the anti-conscription cause by confusing it with an anti-
war stance.
49
 
 
There were still references to the United States in the Australian labour press. But these 
were now limited to brief updates on American labour, socialist or political news. Typical 
are brief reports that organised labour is growing in New York, Debs is not running for 
President, and Wilson favours preparedness.
50
  Occasionally, US attitudes to the war 
were smuggled in through short notes or cartoons, although these are simply mentioned 
without comment.
51
 But developments in the United States are almost never cited as a 
model or made part of an argument by analogy about what Australia ought to do. The one 
time US lessons are directly invoked, it is not at the initiative of the anti-conscriptionists, 
but in an attempt to rebut claims that Prime Minister Hughes had introduced about the 
significance of conscription during the American Civil War.
52
  
 
Instead of the United States, it was Canada that now loomed large. Canada was the 
country which provided the closest match with Australia during these years. And Canada, 
it seemed clear, had rejected conscription. Conservative Prime Minister Borden, Liberal 
Opposition leader Laurier, Acting Prime Minister Rogers, Canadian Defence Minister 
Hughes, and Canadian labour leaders were all quoted to the same effect.
53
 In particular, 
the statements in parliament by the Prime Minister and Leader of Opposition that neither 
had any intention of introducing conscription were repeated over and over again. If “loyal 
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Canada … declines to put on the shackles of militarism” why should Australia.54 This, 
thought one anti-conscriptionist, was their “best argument”.55 
 
In fact, Canada did eventually introduce conscription. A bill was passed in July 1917, 
although it was not implemented until January 1918, after Borden successfully took the 
issue to the country in a controversial federal election on 17 December 1917. And this, of 
course, meant that appeals to Canada by Australian anti-conscriptionists fell away during 
the second referendum campaign in December 1917. But in 1916, there was no indication 
that any such changes were in the offing, and Borden’s subsequent ‘conversion’ to 
conscription was quite unexpected within Canada itself.
56
  
 
Prior to the first referendum, “Canada’s Commonsense” was invoked repeatedly in 
Australia both in stand-alone articles and to augment other arguments in the labour 
press,
57
 by socialist and Christian peace activists,
58
 at major rallies,
59
 and every week 
during the referendum campaign itself.
60
 
 
Other British dominions provided additional points of reference. But many of these had 
problems of their own. And none of these countries was invoked as repeatedly as the 
Canadian case. New Zealand was discussed at some length. But this was not because it 
was a model but because it was a source of concern and vexation. The labour press 
followed the process that led to the enactment of conscription in August 1916 and its 
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implementation in November, and offered advice to affected trans-Tasman unionists.
61
 In 
the lead up to the referendum, it tried to contain the significance of the New Zealand 
decision by engaging in a kind of wishful thinking. It highlighted the fact that the 
decision had yet to be implemented and the calls from NZ labour leaders for a ‘no’ vote, 
implying that the Australian referendum would decide the fate of conscription in New 
Zealand as well.
62
 South Africa had not introduced conscription. But this was only 
occasionally mentioned. It was not so clearly an analogous case and it conjured up the 
controversy and accusations of disloyalty surrounding the Boer war. In addition, Ireland 
was also free of conscription. And this was sometimes invoked. Though still a part of the 
United Kingdom, it was exempted from the provisions of Britain’s conscription laws 
until late in the war. But what is striking, overall, especially given all the discussion of 
the ‘Irish vote’, is how infrequently the Irish example is highlighted or even mentioned.63 
Striking, but not, perhaps, surprising. After all, Ireland, especially after the Easter 
Uprising, raised the very issues of disloyalty that anti-conscriptionists were trying to 
avoid and it threatened, in addition, to involve them in sectarian strife.  
 
The Arguments Compared   
 
Both the ‘Continental despotism’ and ‘Canadian commonsense’ arguments served to 
minimise the target which anti-conscriptionists presented to their loyalist opponents. By 
limiting the grounds on which they would be susceptible to attack, they took care to avoid 
opening up distracting extra fronts. Each could appeal to proponents of both the British 
tradition and the New World interpretations of the liberalism argument. Neither required 
anti-conscriptionists to take a stand on whether Britain itself was worth emulating or part 
of the problematic Old World.  Continental despotism could be seen as the enemy of the 
New World as well of as the British tradition. And Canada could be seen as a British as 
well as a New World model. Each enabled anti-conscriptionists to finesse the dilemma 
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they faced, though they did so in different ways. In particular, while the Canadian 
argument dealt with the loyalism dilemma by focusing on the best positive model of what 
to emulate, the continential despotism argument dealt with it by focusing on the paradigm 
negative model of what to avoid.   
 
Arguably, however, the continental despotism argument had a number of additional 
advantages. First, social movements often find that a negative argument that focuses on a 
common enemy is a better mobilising tool because it helps them to unify the broadest 
group of supporters. Hence the frequency of slogans that say ‘no to this’ or ‘ban that’. 
Second, unlike the Canadian argument, the Continental despotism argument was not 
susceptible to changes of policy that might occur elsewhere. Third, it enabled anti-
conscriptionists to draw on widespread and well entrenched popular attitudes towards 
military matters – attitudes reflected in the special status of Napoleon in public debate 
and the seemingly countless Nelson streets and Wellington roads.
64
 Just how widespread 
they were is evident from the way in which Labor appealed to them itself during the 1914 
federal election campaign.
65
 And fourth, it provided an intellectually powerful immanent 
critique of the conscriptionists own arguments.  If defeating Prussian militarism was the 
purpose of the war, then how could it be right to introduce Prussian military methods 
ourselves? We cannot destroy Prussian militarism, they argued, by adopting Prussian 
militarism ourselves. The continental despotism argument enabled anti-conscriptionists to 
show that the premises of their opponents own arguments seemed to lead to conclusions 
that were the opposite of those they drew. Moreover, this critique enabled them to take 
the crude allegation of disloyalty to which they were subjected and throw it back at their 
opponents. ‘It’s you who are pro-Kaiser!’ they could say in riposte.  
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The rhetorical importance of the continental despotism argument can be seen from the 
extensive efforts that pro-conscriptionists made to address and refute it.
66
 They constantly 
found themselves having to justify the claim that though they favoured conscription, it 
would be different to conscription elsewhere. They did not want it in its “continental 
form”. Nobody wants “continental conscription” they said. They were for “democratic 
conscription” not “military conscription”, for “Australian” not “German conscription”, or 
for “British National Service” not “the Prussian brand”.67 
 
In the process, they often felt it necessary to acknowledge the force of their opponents 
claims. Conscription was “unpalatable” agreed one of the earliest pro-conscription 
responses to Boote’s editorial line.68 Former Secretary Vivash of the Victorian Railways 
Union, whose letters to the Worker sparked the most sustained debate in the labour press, 
accepted that “compulsory service … is not a nice thing at any time” before going on to 
explain why he thought it was now necessary nevertheless.
69
 A pamphlet issued by the 
pro-conscription National Referendum Council argued that “the ineffaceable character of 
our race will save us from any mischief that militarism may have brought to others. 
…The militarism of Germany is a world-menace … British militarism will be a miracle-
working wand”.70 Characteristically, this seemed to concede as much as it refuted.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Liberty-based arguments lay at the heart of labour movement opposition to conscription. 
They were not the only reasons for this opposition, but they were persistent and central 
reasons from the outset. However, in making these arguments, labour anti-
conscriptionists had to confront a dilemma. The dilemma was partly a function of their 
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attempt to simultaneously straddle commitments to Australian nationalism and empire 
loyalism. But it was the public rhetoric of their opponents – and their great rallying cry of 
‘loyalty’ – that gave it particular salience. How could labour anti-conscriptionists parry 
the charge of disloyalty that was central to the argument of their opponents? They 
reached for two ways of framing their argument in order to do so.  
 
The first emphasized the Britishness of the liberal tradition and especially the association 
of conscription with its antithesis – continental despotism. Once Britain itself had 
introduced conscription, this argument became more complicated, since anti-
conscriptionists now had to invoke British tradition against British practice. Shifting the 
focus to continental despotism enabled them to avoid this difficulty. More than this, it 
enabled them to argue that it was the proponents of conscription, by seeking to introduce 
the kinds institutions and values that the war was being fought to defeat, who were doing 
the work of the Prussians.   
 
The second way that labour anti-conscriptionists interpreted their central argument 
emphasized the liberal tradition’s affinity with the New World and especially the 
continuing rejection of conscription in Canada. In the past, the United States had been the 
standard New World point of reference. But censorship and the danger of confusing 
opposition to conscription with opposition to the war, made them wary of that 
comparison. Instead, the then ongoing rejection of conscription by both the government 
and the opposition in ‘loyal Canada’ became the comparison of choice.  
 
Both the ‘continental despotism’ and the ‘Canadian commonsense’ arguments served to 
minimize the target anti-conscriptionists presented to their loyalist opponents. Each could 
appeal to both the British tradition and the New World interpretations of their central 
liberal argument. The continental despotism argument may have had a number of 
additional advantages. And proponents of conscription often felt it necessary to make 
extensive efforts to try to refute it. However, both arguments helped anti-conscriptionists 
deal with the dilemma they faced. While the Canadian commonsense argument focused 
on what to emulate, the continental despotism argument focused on what to avoid. 
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